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WANDERING IN THE WILDERNESS OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: WHEN DO WE ARRIVE AT THE PROMISED
LAND OF JUSTICE?
HONORABLE BRUCE E. BOHLMAN*
ERICK J. BOHLMAN 0 *
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the inception of government-sponsored dispute resolution,
proponents of judicial amelioration have wielded gavels of reform in an
onerous struggle to refine not-so-malleable judicial institutions. Progress,
although slow to come, has resulted. Encouragingly, past generations
have witnessed the downfall of crude judicial procedures such as trial by
battle' and trial by ordeal.2 Due to this evolutionary course of action, the
world is now home to two polar methods of dispute resolution-the
adversarial3 and inquisitorial4 systems. The landscape, however, is ever-
changing and the maps must be revised.
Whatever the method, it should be the goal of any adjudication to
resolve conflicts in a just manner.5 However, critics are unable to agree
as to the best means of achieving this goal. Advocates of both the adver-
sarial and inquisitorial systems claim to more fully effectuate some gener-
ally recognized features of fair adjudication, including: (1) impartiality on
behalf of the decisionmaker;6 (2) rationality underlying the decision;' and
(3) participation in the proceeding by the parties.'
* District Judge, Northeast Central Judicial District, Grand Forks, North Dakota; J.D., 1969,
University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, North Dakota.
"° J.D., 1994, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois.
1. Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J.
301, 320 (1989). "In battle, the litigant challenged his adversary to battle, though champions were
often used to perform the actual fight in civil cases. The winner of the battle, who had also sworn an
oath, thereby proved his case." Id. (footnote omitted).
2. Id. "In ordeal, the party who had the burden of proof was required to swear an oath, then
submit to some test, such as holding a red-hot iron rod for a prescribed time; if the iron did not bum
him, his case was proved." Id. (footnote omitted).
3. For an explanation of the adversarial system, see infra notes 9-26 and accompanying text.
Factors leading to the development of the adversarial system include the following: (1) a tradition of
party control over some aspects of adjudication; (2) a strong legal profession; (3) wide-spread
democratic and individualistic ideals in England; (4) a growing faith in reason in decisionmaking; and
(5) a growing faith in procedure as a substitute for God. Sward, supra note 1, at 326.
4. For an explanation of the inquisitorial system, see infra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
5. See Sward, supra note 1, at 306.
6. Id. at 308.
7. Id. at 309.
8. Id. at 310.
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A. THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM
A product of British tradition,9 the American judicial process typifies
the adversarial model of dispute resolution.' ° The adversarial system is
known for its employment of a neutral and passive fact-finder,' party
presentation of the evidence, and highly structured forensic procedures.' 2
However, recent changes in federal and state rules of civil procedure,
evidence, and professional conduct reflect the ongoing debate in America
as to whether to continue the adversarial system of adjudication.' 3
"In the [adversarial] system, the judge is a relatively passive party
who essentially referees investigations carried out by attorneys."' 4 Propo-
nents of the adversarial system claim that by resisting involvement, the
judge lessens the risk of prematurely committing to one version of the
facts-thereby remaining impartial throughout the proceeding." Oppo-
nents of the adversarial system, on the other hand, believe that such mini-
mal judicial involvement unnecessarily impedes the discovery of facts' 6
and ascertainment of truth.' 7
9. Martin Marcus, Above the Fray or Into the Breach: The Judge's Role in New York's
Adversarial System of Criminal Justice, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 1193, 1193 (1992).
10. See Sward, supra note 1, at 301.
11. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). "The
judiciary . .. may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment." Id.
12. Stephan Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary System, 44 OHIO
ST. L.J. 713, 714 (1983).
The central precept of adversary process is that out of the sharp clash of proofs presented
by adversaries in a highly structured forensic setting is most likely to come the
information from which a neutral and passive decision maker can resolve a litigated
dispute in a manner that is acceptable both to the parties and to society.
Id.
According to another commentator,
[C]haracteristics of the adversary system include reliance on oral testimony, a dialectical
paradigm for truth seeking, decision making by lay jurors, party-controlled procedures,
the riht of parties to waive procedural requirements by mutual agreement, emphasis on
procedure over substantive result, and a neutral judge concerned only with the integrity
of the process.
Franklin Strier, What Can the American Adversary System Learn From an Inquisitorial System of
Justice?, JUDICATURE, Oct.-Nov. 1992, at 109.
13. See Landsman, supra note 12, at 714. "As proceedings became more adversarial, conflicting
ethical demands were exerted upon lawyers. On the one hand, attorneys were expected to be officers
of the court and seek the truth. On the other, they were expected to be keen advocates on behalf of
their clients." Id. at 734-35 (citations omitted).
14. Strier, supra note 12, at 109. In the criminal justice system, "theprinciples of the adversarial
model are respected by the assumption that at trial the prosecutor and the defense attorney can
themselves best present the opposing views of fact and law." Marcus, supra note 9, at 1196.
15. Landsman, supra note 12, at 715. See also Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L.
REV. 374, 376 (1982). "Disengagement and dispassion supposedly enable judges to decide cases fairly
and impartially." Id. "[Tihe judge is a neutral and detached magistrate whose function is to mediate
and resolve the opposing parties' inevitable conflicts." Marcus, supra note 9, at 1193.
16. Sward, supra note 1, at 302. The main failures in the adversarial system are in the realm of
fact-finding. Id. For example, the parties and their attorneys control the introduction of evidence;
the parties may not have attorneys of equal skill; and the judge or jury is given too little information to
make an intelligent well-informed decision in many cases, largely due to the passive role of the court.
17. Strier, supra note 12, at 162. "Critics have long contended that the truth is given too low a
value in adversarial trials." Id.
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Further, highly structured forensic procedures' 8 are designed to
ensure that the resolution of disputes will be rational and reasonably pre-
dictable, affording citizens the facility to determine the probable legal
consequences of their actions. 9 Others maintain that the adversarial sys-
tem places too much emphasis on the conduct of proceedings, needlessly
diverting attention from the substance of the lawsuit.2°
Finally, party presentation of the evidence is intended to reveal the
facts and law that the litigants deem most important to their case, thereby
leading to a decision specifically tailored to their individual needs. 21 Crit-
ics of the adversarial system contend that the private agendas of the par-
ties frequently conflict with the agendas of the state.22 Thus, the judge is
often forced to reach a conclusion without the benefit of all relevant infor-
mation, resulting in a decision which may not be the best policy response
to a particular situation.2a
Despite its continued popularity, many commentators believe that
the adversarial system creates pointless animosity between the parties:24
The emphasis on "winning" in court can direct parties away
from a cooperative search for a solution to their dispute. If
there is a continuing relationship between the parties, this may
cause problems between them by channeling energy to prepara-
tion for adversary encounters, rather than focusing on preven-
tive actions to minimize disputes and develop problem-solving
skills.,
Moreover, many believe that the adversarial system inspires attorneys to
resort to "tricky" tactics, which add to the hostility between the parties.26
B. THE INQUISITORIAL SYSTEM
The inquisitorial system, the predominant means of adjudication
throughout the world 2 7 is characterized by judicial control over the gath-
18. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence are examples of
some of the highly structured forensic procedures which comprise the American adversarial system.
"[T]he rules confine the authority of the judge to manage the proceedings: judges are not free to pick
and choose the evidence they think most appropriate- but are bound to obey the previously fixed
evidentiary prescripts." Landsman, supra note 12, at 716 (citations omitted).
19. Sward, supra note 1, at 313.
20. See Strier, supra note 12, at 109.
21. Landsman, supra note 12, at 715.
22. Strier, supra note 12, at 109.
23. Id.; see also Landsman, supra note 12, at 714-15.
24. See, e.g., KEITH JOHNSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
(WISCONSIN LECISLATrVE COUNCIL STAFF) 4 (Apr. 5, 1985).
25. Id.
26. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 85 (1949).
27. Sward, supra note 1, at 301.
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ering of evidence and the elicitation of testimony.28 The parties and their
attorneys assist the judge in this endeavor, but their role is merely sup-
portive and supplementary: 2
9
Inquisitorial systems of adjudication are more communitarian
than individualistic in nature. The goal is to seek the socially
correct solution to' the litigants' dispute by demanding coopera-
tion among court and litigants in the development of evidence
and argument. In theory, less importance is given to individual
self-interest .... [T]he judge, with a broader, disinterested per-
spective, has a relatively free hand in pursuing investigations
and is not confined to considering only the parties' interests and
arguments.°
Opponents of the inquisitorial system fear that active participation by
the judge in a proceeding increases the likelihood of partiality.31 Further,
they believe that such an approach may teach judges to value statistics,
such as the quantity of pretrial dispositions more than quality.32 Finally,
judicial management in an inquisitorial system is usually less visible and
more difficult to review.- Thus, safeguards against judicial abuse are not
as prevalent in an inquisitorial system as they are in an adversarial
system.3
28. Marcus, supra note 9, at 1193. In the inquisitorial system, it is the judge who is primarily
responsible for calling and questioning witnesses. Patricia Anne Kuhn, Societe Nationale Industrielle
Aerospatiale: The Supreme Court's Misguided Approach to the Hague Evidence Convention, 69 B.U.
L. REv. 1011, 1021 (1989).
"While the adversarial model looks to the partisan efforts of the [attorneys] to search for the
truth and to protect the public and the [parties], the inquisitorial model depends upon the even-
handed initiative of the judge." Marcus, supra note 9, at 1195. Features of the inquisitorial system
include:
[Rieliance on official documentation, a scientific paradigm for truth seeking, no juries but
a career judiciary trained specifically for the bench rather than the American model of
selecting judges from the ranks of practicing attorneys, nonpartisan state-controlled
procedure, rigid state regulation of the legal process, and activist judges who intervene to
ensure a solution based on the merits of the case.
Strier, supra note 12, at 109.
29. Marcus, supra note 9, at 1193. "[T]he judge has primary responsibility not only for
determining the relevant facts, but also for gathering and eliciting those facts. The parties assist the
judge in this task, but their role is only secondary and supportive." Id.
30. Sward, supra note 1, at 315. "[C]ountries employing the inquisitorial system look to the
state for the resolution of social problems and the formulation of social policies; adjudication serves as
a vehicle for the enforcement of state policies." Strier, supra note 12, at 109 (citation omitted).
31. Landsman, supra note 12, at 715. The "[aidversary theory suggests that if the decision maker
strays from the passive role he risks prematurely committing himself to one version of the facts and
failing to appreciate the value of all of the evidence." Id. (citation omitted).
32. Resnik, supra note 15, at 380. "Judicial management has its own techniques, goals, and
values, which appear to elevate speed over deliberation . . . ." Id. at 424-25.
33. Id. at 380. "In addition to enhancing the power of judges, management tends to undermine
traditional constraints on the use of that power." Id. at 425. For example, when judges set rules
regulating a proceeding, such as discovery timetables, they are -not forced to submit [these] ideas to
the discipline of a written justification or to outside scrutiny." Id.
34. Id. at 380.
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C. THE HYBRID SYSTEM
Both the adversarial and inquisitorial models of dispute resolution
can achieve fair adjudication when properly implemented3W Both have
desirable elements and built-in biases.3 6 However, it should be noted
that "the [adversarial] and inquisitorial systems are not alternatives for
achieving the same theoretical objective: the [adversarial] system serves
to resolve conflict, while the inquisitorial system serves to enforce state
goals."'3' Accordingly, there has been a trend in the United States and
elsewhere to develop a new system of dispute resolution, which combines
the meritorious elements of each of the principal systems, thus resulting
in a hybrid method of dispute resolution. 8
Many of the elements of inquisitorial dispute resolution have already
found their way into the American judical system.3 9 This article will
examine some of these concepts in the pretrial, trial, and posttrial phases
of litigation, it will explore the role of nonadversarial dispute resolution as
a part of the adjudication process, and finally, further refinements will be
suggested in order to bring about a better judicial system.
II. INQUISITORIAL ELEMENTS IN AMERICAN
ADJUDICATION
Many elements of the inquisitorial method of dispute resolution have
already worked their way into the American judicial system. Moreover,
the North Dakota rules of evidence and procedure, which are based on
the corresponding federal rules, reveal many inquisitorial attributes in the
pretrial, trial, and posttrial phases of litigation. Most American judges and
litigators, though, are not familiar with these attributes. Therefore, a
comprehensive examination of these rules and their application is
necessary.
A. THE PRETRIAL PHASE
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have recently been changed to
require mandatory disclosure of certain information.4" Broadly stated,
the new rules require parties to disclose, without request, information to
opposing parties that under the old rules could have been withheld unless
35. Sward, supra note 1, at 316.
36. Id.
37. Strier, supra note 12, at 109.
38. See Id. at 162.
39. See Id.
40. See Colleen McMahon & Jordan G. Schwartz, Proposed Revisions to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, C780 ALI-ABA 815, 824 (June 3, 1993).
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requested.4 Discovery, especially mandatory discovery without request,
is a nonadversarial element in adjudication.42 Discovery allows the parties
to learn facts that the opposing parties know, equalizing the knowledge
possessed by the parties.43 "In a sense, it is an admission that the assump-
tion of equality behind adversarial theory is unfounded; to overcome the
inequality, the parties must be required to share their factual
information."44
Recently, judges have been playing a greater role in discovery and
other pretrial aspects of litigation. Devices such as the pretrial confer-
ence 45 and the discovery conference enable judges to get involved in liti-
gation before it proceeds to trial. Judges are able to establish and enforce
schedules and timetables, rule on pretrial motions, and sanction parties
before proceeding to trial.
For example, in Gohner v. Zundel,4 the North Dakota Supreme
Court held that under limited circumstances, a trial court judge can sanc-
tion a party for not appearing at a pretrial conference.47 In Gohner,
James Gohner sued Joseph Zundel for work which he had done on land
that he had rented from Zundel.' Zundel denied the allegations and
requested a jury trial.49 Zundel also filed a counterclaim.50 However,
shortly before the scheduled pretrial conference, Zundel fired his attor-
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 26. Under the new Rule 26, parties are required to disclose, without
request: (1) the names, addresses, and phone numbers of individuals likely to have relevant,
discoverable information; (2) copies or descriptions of all relevant documents or things in the
disclosing party's possession or control; (3) a computation of damages claimed by the disclosing party
and copies or materials upon which the computation is based; and (4) copies of insurance agreements
under which an insurer might be liable for all or part of any judgment that might be entered. Id.
42. Sward, supra note 1, .at 328.
43. Id. at 327.
44. Id. According to Sward,
[D]iscovery is a non-adversarial element in adjudication. It works some changes in both
party control and judicial passivity, but the scope of those changes is open to some
ebate. On the one hand, dscovery was designed to operate independently of the judge
to the extent possible. With rare exceptions, no judicial order is required to conduct
discovery. The parties involve the judge only when they have a dispute over discovery.
Thus, the traditional roles of the parties and the judge are preserved. On the other hand,
the parties are required, under the threat of sanctions that could include loss of the case
or contempt, to turn over facts in their possession to their opponent in the litigation. The
party, then, loses some control over what he does with the information he has.
Id. at 328 (citations omitted).
45. According to the North Dakota Supreme Court,
[T]he pretrial conference is generally accepted as an effective method to shorten and
simplify litigation by eliminating uncontested issues and settling certain pretrial motions.
In doubtfue cases, the pretria conference provides a vehicle for expedient, informal
settlement. Its use is to be encouraged from the standpoint of saving time and expense to
the litigants and valuable time and resources of the courts.
Fiebiger v. Fischer, 276 N.W.2d 241, 245 (N.D. 1979).
46. 411 N.W.2d 75 (N.D. 1987).
47. Gohner v. Zundel, 411 N.W.2d 75, 75 (N.D. 1987).
48. Id. at 76.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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ney.-5  He did not appear at the pretrial conference.5 2 Consequently, the
trial court struck Zundel's counterclaim and request for a trial by jury.s
Thereafter, Zundel sought a continuance and asked that his counterclaim
and jury request be reinstated.- The trial court refused .5
On appeal, the supreme court applied an old version of Rule 16 of
the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure and held that the sanction of
dismissal could only be used against a plaintiff, "the party with the labor-
ing oar," for not appearing at a pretrial conference. 56  Thus, the court
treated Zundel as the plaintiff for purposes of his counterclaim, upheld
the dismissal of the counterclaim, but reversed the dismissal of Zundel's
request for a trial by jury.5 7 The court thereby endorsed the power of a
judge to make effective use of pretrial conferences but, at the same time,
strictly limited that power to protect the litigants.58
B. THE TRIAL PHASE
The general rule is that "[a] judge presiding on a trial is not a
mere moderator, but has active duties to perform without parti-
ality in seeing that the truth is developed, and it is his duty in
the exercise of sound discretion to elicit the evidence upon rele-
vant and material points involved in the case."59
Despite this empowering mandate by the North Dakota Supreme
Court, trial judges, accustomed to the adversarial system, have been hesi-
tant to comply. Moreover, due to general uncertainty as to the expanded
limitations of this power and inexperience with aggressive judicial involve-
ment, judges who have sought to become active participants in the trial
process have found their actions subject to examination, and sometimes
reversal, on appeal.
51. Id.
52. Gohner, 411 N.W.2d at 76.
53. Id. at 77.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 79.
57. Gohner, 411 N.W.2d at 79.
58. See, e.g., id.
59. Pritchett v. Executive Director of the Social Serv. Bd., 325 N.W.2d 217, 222 (N.D. 1982)
(quoting Messer v. Bruening, 156 N.W. 241, 242 (N.D. 1916)).
It is the long-standing position [in North Dakota] that the trial judge has discretion as to
how a trial shall be conducted and that he is more than a referee whose function it is to
see that any contest is carried on in strict accordance with the rules, to the end that the
decision may be awarded to the more skillful; rather, it is the duty of the trial judge to
keep the examination of witnesses reasonably within bounds, so that the real issues may
not be obscured but he must do so in a proper manner and without violation of any of the
rules of evidence.
Bergquist-Walker Real Estate v. Clairmont, Inc., 353 N.W.2d 766, 769 (N.D. 1984).
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The North Dakota Rules of Evidence grant trial courts broad discre-
tion to control the presentation of evidence at trial:
The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and
order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as
to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the
ascertainment of truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time,
and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue
embarrassment.60
Particularly, Rule 614, which authorizes trial courts to call and interrogate
witnesses, and Rule 706, which allows trial courts to appoint experts,
enable judges to actively participate in the proceedings.
1. Judicial Interrogation of Witnesses
Rule 614 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence, which is identical
to the corresponding federal rule, grants to North Dakota trial courts the
power to call and interrogate witnesses.6 ' This rule causes a deviation
from the court's traditional role in the adversarial system in which it was
the parties and their representatives who were exclusively responsible for
calling and interrogating witnesses.
However, this new grant of authority is justified only when applied
according to certain precepts. On the one hand, the trial judge must be
careful to vigilantly protect the parties' right to a fair trial. On the other
hand, the court must be free to clarify testimony and ferret out elusive
facts.6 2 If judicial participation extends beyond these restraints, grounds
for reversal may exist.
"Factors that an appellate court may consider in evaluating the
impact of the judge's questioning are whether the witnesses' tes-
timony needed clarification, whether the witnesses were unusu-
ally hesitant and in need of assurance, whether the court used
leading questions, whether the court interfered with cross-
examination, whether the court's interruptions favored one side
exclusively, whether the court instructed the jury to arrive at
60. N.D. R. Evid. 611(a).
61. Id. at 614. Rule 614 provides:
(A) CALLUNC BY COURT. The court, on its own motion or at the suggestion of a party,
may call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-examine witnesses thus
cal led.
(B) INTERROCATION BY COURT. The court may interrogate witnesses, whether called by
itself or by a party.
(c) OBJECTIONS. Objections to the calling of witnesses by the court or to interrogation
by it may be made at the time or at the next available opportunity when the jury is
not present.
62. State v. Yodsnulds, 281 N.W.2d 255, 260 (N.D. 1979).
[Vol. 70:235
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their own conclusions, whether the parties were being ade-
quately represented, and whether an objection to the question-
ing was made."''
In State v. Yodsnukis,6 the North Dakota Supreme Court applied
the above factors and found that a trial judge's extensive interrogation of a
witness in a criminal proceeding was unfairly prejudicial.6 In Yodsnukis,
a man wearing a stocking cap committed a robbery at a restaurant in
Grand Forks, North Dakota.6 An employee of the restaurant later iden-
tified Joseph Yodsnukis as the perpetrator.67 During the ensuing trial, the
judge asked the investigating officer, Ralph Downey, fourteen questions
regarding the weather conditions and the motivation for the defendant to
wear a stocking cap, suggesting that it may have been worn to disguise his
long hair.68 Yodsnukis objected to the line of questioning and asked for a
new trial. 9 The trial judge denied Yodsnukis's motion.7 °
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that Downey's
testimony needed no clarification.7 Specifically, the court determined
that
[allthough the judge interrogated witnesses for both sides, in
large part favoring neither side, the leading questions posed to
Officer Downey might well have led jurors to believe that the
judge thought the robber wore a stocking cap to conceal his
long hair. A jury might have properly drawn this inference from
the testimony of various witnesses, but that inference should
have been developed by the State, not the trial judge.'
Based on this determination, the court reversed the district court's denial
of the defendant's motion and remanded the case for a new trial.73
63. Id. at 261 (citation omitted).
64. 281 N.W.2d 255 (N.D. 1979).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 256.
67. Id. at 257.
68. Id. at 261-62. For example, the following dialogue took place when the trial judge asked the
investigating officer questions:
Q. I'm speaking or inquiring in terms of the robber wearing the stocking cap?
A. Maybe someone wouldn't think about it but I would have a tendency to wonder
about someone wearing a stocking cap in that type of a situation, but again the
average man on the street probably wouldn't think anything of it.
Q. To me wouldn't it indicate an attempt to disguise your hair for instance?
A. I would think so.
Yodsnukis, 281 N.W.2d at 261.
69. Id. at 262.
70. Id. at 256.
71. Id. at 262.
72. Id. (citations omitted).
73. Yodsnukis, 281 N.W.2d at 262.
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Notwithstanding its holding in Yodsnukis, in Pritchett v. Executive
Director of the Social Serv. Bd, 4 the North Dakota Supreme Court
allowed extensive judicial participation in the elicitation of testimony for
purposes of clarification.75 In Pritchett, Meredyth Pritchett petitioned for
the termination of her child's father's parental rights, claiming that he had
never paid child support.76 At the same time, Meredyth's current hus-
band, Robert Pritchett, petitioned to adopt the child." During the pro-
ceeding, the trial judge questioned the biological father regarding his
financial ability to support himself and his daughter.7" The father
appealed, claiming that the questioning by the judge was improper.79
Upon review, the court affirmed the trial court and concluded that
the examination was within the court's discretion. 0
In a criminal case the judge ordinarily asks questions to make
testimony comprehensible to the jurors. In a civil case, and
especially a termination-of-parental-rights case, we consider it
proper and we encourage the trial judge to ask those questions
necessary for his comprehension of the total situation.81
These cases demonstrate how far a trial judge can go in interrogating
witnesses at trial. Generally, it appears a judge has complete authority to
ask any questions which are necessary to elicit and clarify the facts.
Beyond that, however, a judge has no legitimate role in the interrogation
of witnesses under the North Dakota Rules of Evidence. 2
74. 325 N.W.2d 217 (N.D. 1982).
75. Pritchitt v. Executive Director of the Social Serv. Bd., 325 N.W.2d 217, 222 (N.D. 1982).
76. Id. at 218.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 222. For example, the following dialogue took place, when the trial judge asked
questions of the father:
Q. You have earned $100 in three months. How else have you been living?
A. My friend has been supporting me; things like that. I got a friend I owe two, three
hundred for this.
Q. This man you are living with feeds you and clothes you?
A. We go and hunt whenever we can, like we did quite a bit of duck hunting and we do
what we can. If it gets tight I shovel a sidewak or whatever.
Id.
79. Pritchitt, 325 N.W.2d at 222.
80. Id. at 222-23.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 55 N.W.2d 218, 221 (1952) (discussing the trial judge's
participation in the examination of witnesses).
According to the North Dakota Supreme Court,
[A] trial judge has the right to propound such questions to witnesses as may be necessary
to elicit pertinent facts, in order that the truth may be established, although some
reviewing courts have declared that the practice of so doing except when absolutely
necessary should be discouraged. "Accordingly, the trial court has power to recall a
witness who has been examined, and propound questions to him. He may cross-examine
a witness, or ask him leading questions. And he may elicit any relevant and material
evidence, without regard to its effect, whether beneficial or prejudicial to one party or the
other. Indeed, it has been declared to be the duty of the court to propound such
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2. Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses
North Dakota courts have an inherent power to appoint expert wit-
nesses.83 Originally, though, because the judiciary was generally accus-
tomed to party control over the presentation of evidence, this power was
infrequently used and often misunderstood.
For example, in Hultberg v. Hultberg, the North Dakota Supreme
Court held that a trial judge made improper use of court-appointed
expert testimony.84 In Hultberg, June Hultberg sought a divorce from
her husband, Henning Hultberg, and asked that their jointly-held prop-
erty be divided.8 The trial court appointed an expert to appraise the
value of the property, and, upon this report, divided the property between
the parties."6 The judge did not introduce the report into evidence or
allow the parties to cross-examine the expert.8 ' The defendant objected
to the court's use of the report.
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that although the
trial judge had authority to commission the expert, the report should have
been introduced into evidence and the expert should have been available
for cross-examination.88  Therefore, the issue of the division of property
was remanded for a new hearing. 9
Based on cases such as this, in 1977, North Dakota adopted Rule 706
of the Federal Rules of Evidence.90 This rule sets forth a detailed
questions to reluctant witnesses as will strip them of the subterfuges to which they resort
to evade telling the truth. The extent to which such examination shall be conducted rests
in the discretion of the judge, the exercise of which will not be controlled unless abused."
Id. at 221-22 (quoting 58 AM JUJR. Witnesses, § 557 (1948)) (citation omitted). Moreover, it is not an
abuse of authority for a trial judge to ask preliminary questions for the purpose of establishing the
foundation necessary to admit evidence. State v. Olson, 244 N.W.2d 718, 722 (N.D. 1976).
83. Hultberg v. Hultberg, 259 N.W.2d 41, 45 (N.D. 1977) (discussing the district court's power
to appoint a real estate expert to appraise the property in question).
84. Hultberg, 259 NW.2d at 45.
85. Id. at 42.
86. Id. at 45.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Hultbert, 259 N.W.2d at 45. The Court stated that
[t]he trial judge has wide discretion concerning the manner in which he uses an
appointee's testimony, providing the parties' rights are not violated. We find that the
district court erred by using the report of the court-appointed appraiser wherein the
report was not introduced into evidence and the parties were not given an opportunity to
cross-examine the appraiser.
Id.
90. Rule 706 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence provides, in pertinent part:
(A) APPOINTMENT. The court, on motion of any party or its own motion, may enter an
order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and may request the
parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon
by the parties, and may select expert witnesses of its own selection. An expert witness
may not be appointed by the court unless the witness consents to act. A witness soappoi ted shalbe informed of the witness' duties by the court in writing, a copy of which
shall be fded with the clerk, or at a conference in which the parties have opportunity to
participate. A witness so appointed shall advise the parties of the witness' findings, if any;
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description of a trial court's ability to call and utilize expert witnesses. 9 '
Specifically, the rule provides that all court-appointed expert witnesses
are subject to cross-examination by any party. 2
As demonstrated by Yodsnukis, Pritchett, and Hultberg, judicial
intervention is often necessary either to enhance the truth-seeking pro-
cess or to protect the parties' right to effective representation. 93 "In these
situations, the principles of the adversarial model are honored in the
breach, that is, by permitting or even requiring judicial intervention to
compensate for the failures of the [attorneys]."4 Accordingly, trial judges
should understand when to intervene in a judicial proceeding, and to what
extent to participate thereby ensuring fair adjudication at the trial phase.
C. THE PosTrRIAL PHASE
In Association for Retarded Citizens of North Dakota v. Sinner,95 a
nonprofit corporation and individual mentally retarded persons, as a class,
challenged the conditions of confinement and treatment in two state insti-
tutions. 6 The court determined that the institutions were violative of
federal and state law, and issued a detailed implementation order which
governed the states' actions over the next five and one-half years. This
order was eventually extended to ten years. 97 The court retained jurisdic-
tion to enforce the order. 8 Subsequently, many challenges to the state's
compliance have been instigated, and the court has been forced to remain
an active participant in the ongoing dispute.
With the increasing frequency of large-scale, public law litigation,
trial courts, forced to implement complex decrees, have found themselves
the witness' deposition may be taken by any party; and the witness may be called to testify
by the court or any party. The witness is subject to cross-examination by each party,
including a party calling the witness.
(c) DISCLOSURE OF APPOINTMENT. In the exercise of its discretion, the court may
authorize disclosure to the jury of the fact that the court a p pointed the expert witness.
(D) PARTIES' EXPERTS OF OWN SELECTION. Nothing in this rule limits the parties in
calling expert witnesses of their own selection.
N.D. R. EVID. 706.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 706(a).
93. Marcus, supra note 9, at 1196.
94. Id. at 1196-97. The recent case of Dewitz by Nuestel v. Emery, 508 N.W. 2d 334 (N.D.
1993), also demonstrates the propriety of a trial judge admonishing attorneys if "they stray into
improper areas and use improper questioning techniques." Id. at 336. However, if the
admonishment might influence the jury, it should take place in chambers. Id. at 337.
95. 561 F. Supp. 473 (D.N.D. 1982).
96. Association of Retarded Citzens of North Dakota v. Sinner, 561 F. Supp. 473, 473 (D.N.D.
1982). "The position of unnamed class members presents the most obvious compromise of
adversarial principles. Unnamed class members have no choice in the initiation of a suit that can
affect them profoundly." Sward, supra note 1, at 333.
97. See Association of Retarded Citizens of North Dakota v. Sinner, 942 F.2d 1235, 1237 (8th
Cir. 1991).
98. Id. at 1238.
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supervising the litigants long after the original trial has concluded.99 Judi-
cial orders to combat the effects of racial prejudice in employment, pro-
mote school desegregation, and encourage humanitarian efforts to
improve state-run institutions all demonstrate the need for extended judi-
cial involvement in litigation. Such long-term involvement was not
authorized under the traditional adversarial system. Instead, litigants
were forced to initiate new proceedings every time that they wished the
court to intervene. Now, because of the strong inquisitorial influence,
American courts can maintain jurisdiction over a dispute for a prolonged
period of time, thereby saving the litigants and society unnecessary delay
and expense.
III. FURTHER REFINEMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The adversarial system and the inquisitorial systems were undoubt-
edly products of the social and economic conditions under which they
developed. To the extent that we have adopted some features of the
inquisitorial method within our adversarial system is a recognition that
our current dispute resolution culture is evolving toward more active judi-
cial management of the dispute at an early stage of the proceeding.
Judicial case management techniques, such as discovery confer-
ences, 1°° scheduling orders setting dates for completion of pretrial proce-
dures,10 1 and settlement conferences °0 are useful in the resolution of
disputes before trial. These procedures produce settlements in many
cases because various court orders require lawyers to meet and discuss
various issues and prepare discovery plans, settlement proposals and pre-
trial statements. Settlements are much more likely to result when lawyers
have pretrial deadlines to meet and are required to prepare the case in a
climate of cooperation with opposing counsel. Early setting of a firm trial
date provides the impetus to prepare thoroughly and settle the case
before incurring additional expense for the client in the form of a trial. If
pretrial management of the case is effective, both sides should be pre-
99. Sward, supra note 1, at 353. Sward noted:
This analysis suggests some uncertainty over the proper approach to social change. On
the one hand, ith-Tas traditionally been considered a legislative function to determine the
direction society will take. The legislative process is investigative, inquisitorial. It
requires active investigators, and the concept ota "party" is non-existent in the legislative
process. On the other hand, the value of a debate, in which the strongest cases are made
for and aainst theproposed change, is also unquestionable .... [I1n combination with
the nonadversarial devices that help judges and parties evaluate factually complex issues
and join all interested parties, it is not surprising that the adversary system has taken on
the challenge of such socially transforming litigation.
Id. at 353-54 (footnotes omitted).
100. N.D. R. Civ. P. 26(0.
101. N.D. R. Crv. P. 16(a).
102. N.D. R. Crv. P. 16(b)(7).
1994]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
pared to discuss settlement much earlier in the proceeding, thereby
avoiding "courthouse step" settlements and needless trials. Although
there is no statistical evidence available, it is certainly true that the more
unprepared the parties are during the pretrial phase, the more likely it is
that a trial will result. All too often, such trials are sorry spectacles of
unprepared attorneys doing their discovery work during the trial itself.
It is, therefore, not surprising that judicial activism, or case manage-
ment, is seen as a necessary reform to the adversary system; a survival
technique for the judicial system as a whole. If the passive judge model
epitomized by the adversary system were continued, with parties and law-
yers controlling the proceeding, the judicial system would sink under the
ever-increasing caseload. The legal cultural mileau requires that greater
numbers of cases be settled at earlier times so that scarce judicial
resources can be allotted more efficiently to the disputes that truly
require a jury or court trial.
The introduction of court-sponsored mediation and other alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) techniques create another revolutionary shift
within the judiciary, in which judges play a much different role than
played by the traditional adjudicator. Courts are now in a different mode
and procedure than contemplated by either the adversary or the inquis-
torial systems. 10 3 The issue thus becomes whether courts are well suited
for this role, and whether limitations should be placed on judicial ADR
programs.1 "4 In North Dakota, the settlement judge concept is growing
103. Actually, court-sponsored ADR may be another facet of judicial activism or case
management since the judge is actively participating in the settlement phase of the proceeding, rather
than passively waiting for the parties to exhaust their own negotiation efforts.
104. It could be argued that judges should restrict their activity to judging, thus forcing the
litigants themselves to settle the vast majority of cases without help from the courts. Furthermore, if
ADR in the courts is not limited to Rule 16 settlement conferences, the demands on the court for
other services, such as summary jury trials, minitrials, and arbitration, will overwhelm the resources
available to carry out the primary function of adjudication under the adversary system.
248 [Vol. 70:235
1994] PROMISED LAND OF JUSTICE 249
in the state courts.'0 5 The federal courts, through the efforts of Magis-
trate Karen Klein, have been using the technique since 1985."
The use of judges to settle disputes through nonadversarial means is
an important and fundamental innovation. Carried to its logical conclu-
sion, the judiciary may be divided into settlement judges and trial judges.
Specialization is a powerful force in the world today, and the judiciary is
no exception. Tax courts, 0 7 probate courts,'08 family courts,' 0 9 and juve-
nile courts" 0 are but a few examples of the ways that courts have special-
ized in substantive areas of the law.
The concept of settlement through nonadversarial means presents
many questions. First, should judges be assigned to this task, or should
ADR be conducted outside the judicial system by private practitioners?"'
Are judges in power roles particularly unsuited for settling disputes by
"alternative" techniques?" 2 Will the parties have a right of recourse to
the adversarial process if they are dissatisfied with ADR? 1 3 What advan-
tages are there to court-sponsored ADR that are not available through the
private sector?"' Is the cost to the parties of private ADR a significant
105. District Judge Lee A. Christofferson, Northeast Judicial District, in Devils Lake, North
Dakota and North Dakota Supreme Court Justice William A. Neumann (formerly a district court
judge in the Northeast District) developed a settlement conference procedure under Rule 16 of the
North Dakota Civil Rules Procedure. Pursuant to the settlement conference, the trial judge does not
articipate in the conference, and the conference is not of record. The participants are encouraged to
be open and to negotiate in good faith. The settlement judge acts as a facilitator in the process hut
does not serve an adjudicatory role, except as may be incidental to providing the parties with an
evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of each side. Judge Christofferson emphasizes that the
process must be voluntary and that the parties and counsel must be committed in attempting to settle
their case. He indicates that out of sixteen cases utilizing this conference, thirteen have settled.
Interview with Judge Lee A. Christofferson, Northeast Judicial District (Feb. 10, 1994).
I have also used this settlement conference technique, both as a settlement judge for other trial
judges in the Northeast Central Judicial District and as a trial judge requesting settlement conference
services from participating judges in the district.
Other judges throughout the state are also working in an informal network to provide settlement
conference services. One of the first priorities for the network is to arrange for training of interested
judges in ADR techniques, primarily mediation and arbitration.
106. Honorable Karen K. Klein, Address to the North Dakota Judicial Institute, University of
North Dakota Law School (May 19, 1993).
107. 26 U.S.C. §§ 7441, et. seq. (1988).
108. N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT, § 201 (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1994).
109. R.I. GEN. LAws ch. 8-10 (1985 & Supp. 1993).
110. N.D. CENT. CODE Ch. 27-20 (1991).
111. See supra note 104. Courts may be eager to provide ADR services in an effort to meet
competition from the private sector. Private judging and other ADR services available through
private profit making entities, such as EnDispute, Judicate, Judicial Arbitration & Mediation Services,
Inc. (JAMS), are making significant inroads, especially in the area of commercial disputes. Exploring
the Issues In Private Judging, 77 JUDICATURE 203 (Jan.-Feb. 1994).
112. ADR must be voluntary and any decisions must be made by the parties. Canon 3(B)(7)(d)
of the NORTH DAKOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT states that: "[a] judge may with the consent of
the parties, confer separately with the parties and their lawyers in an effort to mediate or settle
matters pending before the judge." Id.
113. An ABA committee strongly suggest that such recourse is necessary. ABA Judicial
Administration Comm. on Standards of Judicial Administration, Standards Relating to Court
Organization 1.12.5(a) (1990).
114. One important advantage of court-sponsored ADR, at the present time, is its low cost to
the parties. Since there is no separate charge for the mediating services of a settlement judge, the
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reason for increasing the availability of court-sponsored ADR?" 5 Will
court-sponsored ADR result in a net overall saving of judicial
resources?
16
Each jurisdiction will have to answer each issue (and others) for
itself. It would appear, however, that it is no longer a question of whether
court-sponsored ADR in some form is desirable. Rather, the only ques-
tion that remains is the place of ADR within the system and how court
resources will be allocated to implement its use. The courts must closely
examine legal process to determine if ADR should be only a part of the
usual adjudicative process, or whether separate (or additional) processes
should be identified. An example of such a separate process is mediation
parties are not faced with a bill for such services. If the case does not settle, the trial judge simply
tries the case (again without cost to the parties).
Private ADR can be expensive. The litigants must pay for the cost of such services, even when
ADR is unsuccessful, unless there is some sort of contingent fee arrangement with the private ADR
services. Query, if a contingent fee arrangement for private ADR is appropriate, might not the
mediator press too hard for settlement when the fee is earned only if a settlement is reached? In
what types of cases should a contingent fee arrangement be used and how should the fee be
computed?
The private ADR industry typically charges $400 per hour. See Exploring the Issues in Private
judging, supra note 111, at 204. This will be no small cost if ADR fails to produce a settlement and
litigation is required.
Another advantage of court-sponsored ADR is that of finality. A court-mediated or arbitrated
dispute may be reduced to judgment with all enforcement and collection tools available through the
court. In private ADR, there is no similar court rocess available unless and until action is brought on
the agreement. The right of appeal is not available privately and the procedural processes in private
ADR are not as developed as court process. Id. at 206. However, the rigid court rules and adversarial
fact finding are precisely the reason many parties choose to avoid the courts.
115. By providing court-sponsored ADR at no cost (or at a nominal cost) to the parties, there is a
risk that the courts will be flooded with demands for ADR services, and judges will be assuming a task
that knows no end. Litigants may rely too much on the courts to settle their disputes out-of-court. It
should be an obligation of every attorney to work for settlement of disputes before an action is filed.
See EXEC. ORDER No. 12,778, 3 C.F.R. 359 (1992) (reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519 see. 1(a) (1992)). In
Executive Order No. 12,778, former President George Bush directed all federal attorneys to
emphasize ADR. Executive Order No. 12,778 provides:
(a) Pre-filing Notice of a Complaint. No litigation counsel shall file a complaint
initiating civil litigation without first making a reasonable effort to notify all disputants
about the nature of the dispute and to attempt to achieve a settlement, or confirming that
the referring agency that previously handled the dispute has made a reasonable effort to
notify the disputants and to achieve a settlement or has used its conciliation processes.
(C) Alternative Methods of Resolving the Dispute in Litigation. Litigation counsel shall
make reasonable attempts to resolve a dispute expeditiously and properly before
proceeding to trial.
(1) Whenever feasible, claims should be resolved through informal discussion,
negotiations, and settlements rather than through utilization of any formal or structured
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) process or court proceeding.
Id.
116. No data exists to reasonably answer this question. It is doubtful that judicial resources will
be saved since the time necessary to conduct ADR will have been wasted if the parties would have
settled the case themselves, without any help from the court. However, if attorneys and other
nonjudicial personnel acted as third-party neutrals, judicial resources would be saved. Such savings
are based on the assumption that the cost of obtaining third-party neutrals to assist the court would be
partially offset by fees paid by litigants or by pro bono services.
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with judicial arbitration, in which the judge uses mediation to resolve
most issues and then arbitrates any remaining issues.
117
The crucial task is defining the future role of courts in dispute reso-
lution. It will take the combined effort of all judges, court managers, law-
yers, and legislators to shape the new vision of dispute resolution in the
twenty-first century. We should not limit ourselves to the traditions of the
adversarial and inquisitorial systems. The advent of judicial case manage-
ment and ADR present an opportunity to create a rich menu of proce-
dural choices, thus allowing the parties and the court to customize dispute
resolution procedures to fit each case."' Alternative dispute resolution
must be finely sifted to place it within the redefined process of resolving
disputes through the courts. There should no longer be any necessity for
using the term "ADR" as it relates to the courts. It is essential that ADR
be integrated into an adjucicatory process that includes nonadversarial
components. This is true especially in actions based upon continuing
relationships between the parties when adversarial fact finding is not
worthwhile, and the interests of the parties can best be served by seeking
solutions to problems rather than by assigning blame.
The first step in any future planning or visioning for the judiciary is
to determine the present and anticipated needs of the people to be served
by the system. In that regard, continuing change in our economic and
social culture is inevitable, and planners must build flexibility into the
dispute resolution system, including any ADR components.
The ultimate goal for North Dakota should be to provide a court
system that is responsive to the needs of the people, not just to the needs
of judges and lawyers. Some features of that court system include:
117. Mediation with arbitration is the preferred process in at least two reported programs of
court-sponsored ADR. Judge Mary Davidson, of the District Court in Hennepin County, Minnesota,
has created a "divorce with dignity" process for divorcing couples, in which mediation, intensive case
management, and arbitration are combined to eliminate the adversarial nature of divorce actions. See
NORTH DAKOTA STATE BAR AsSOCIATION FAMILY LAW SECTION ANNUAL SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS
Jan. 21, 1994, Bismarck, ND.
Another court using mediation with arbitration is the Clackamas County Family Court in Oregon
City, Oregon. That court offers arbitration panels consisting of three members including a mental
health professional. The panel is used in custody and visitation disputes. The present _program is
being examined to determine if it can be made binding on the parties. Beyond Mediation: An
Integrative Response to Resolving Custody Disputes, NEWSLETTER (Ass'n of Family and Conciliation
Courts), Fall 1993, at 2.
Judges operate from a power position in the system, and the use of mediation (or mediation with
arbitration) would represent a loss of the hierarchal position in our vertical system of justice. Can the
courts serve as an effective arbiter of societal conflict without relying to a large extent on the power
prerogatives reserved to judges? It is ironic that court-sponsored ADR relies upon a more horizontal
structure of power among equals (and therefore less power for the judiciary), while increased case
management by the judiciary relies upon seizing control of litigation from the parties and their
attorneys, thereby appropriating more power to the judiciary.
118. See Exploring the Issues in Private Judging, supra note 111, at 210.
1994]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:235
1) Establishing a family court, 1 9 with specialized rules
emphasizing nonadversarial procedures (including mediation
with arbitration), which will be responsible for the disposition of
cases that presently comprise over two-thirds, of the total
caseload in district court. 120
2) Expanding small claims court jurisdiction 12  to allow for
informal procedures, with mediation and arbitration compo-
nents, in a greater variety of cases in terms of both dollar
amount of the claims and the types of cases to be heard.
3) Revising the Rules of Civil Procedure to simplify and diver-
sify procedures, thus making the courts more accessible to the
people. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are useful for
complex civil litigation found in the federal system, but too com-
plex and unresponsive to the needs of the litigants in most state
court litigation. The rules should be reviewed and revised to
fulfill the promise of Rule 1 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil
Procedure which provides for a "just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action. 1 22
119. See Bruce E. Bohlman, A Family Court for North Dakota, 67 N.D. L. REV. 353 (1991)
(advocating the creation of a family court system to better protect the needs of the family). In
addition to the features described in the article, the family court structure would ideally include all
juvenile court jurisdiction so that one judge would be dealing with one family. Presently, a district
judge may be residingover a divorce between mother and father while the children may be in
juvenile court before a referee. Neither the judge nor the referee may be aware of the other
proceeding. The one family, one court approach is much more conducive to effective judicial
intervention and management. See Sanford Katz and Jeffrey Kuhn, NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE
AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A MODEL FAMILY COURT: A REPORT FROM
THE NATIONAL FAMILY COURT SYMPOSIUM (May 1991).
120. Actually, in 1992, 60% of all actions in the district courts of North Dakota consisted of
domestic relations cases and 10% consisted of juvenile cases. ANN. REP. NORTH DAKOTA CTS. at 7
(1992).
121. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 27-08.1 (1991 & Supp. 1993). The small claims court should be of
record, however, so that appeals may be directed to the North Dakota Supreme Court as in any other
district court case.
122. N.D. R. Cre. P. 1. The rules should be variegated so that the parties and the court could
design the most appropriate dispute resolution process for each case. The appropriate dispute
resolution process will depend on the type of problem to be resolved and the relationship between
the parties. The dispute resolution process can range from mediation to adversarial fact finding with
the ability to design a total process that might include different techniques for different issues within
the case. For example, in Order 93-13, the Wisconsin Supreme Court created section 802.12 of the
Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure, in which ADR is extensively set forth as an integral part of the








(g) Moderated settlement conferences;
(h) Nonbinding arbitration; and
(i) Summary jury trials.
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4) Providing specific directions for differentiated judicial case
management'2' and defining the role of the judge in nonadver-
sarial discovery conferences, settlement conferences, mediation
with arbitration, minitrials, and summary jury trials.
IV. CONCLUSION
The above suggestions are only a start. Law is a tradition-bound pro-
fession, as shown by the firm historical grip of the adversarial system on
our dispute resolution process. But the public is not satisfied with the
expensive and contentious present system. It will take some breathtaking
daring and courage to redesign the entire justice delivery system.
The North Dakota Judicial Planning Committee has proposed a
vision for the year 2020. The vision proposes that "[t]he Judiciary will
provide universal access to fair, humane, affordable and cost efficient
legal dispute resolution. Access will be quick with swift decision making
by specialist judges with assistance of lay experts, mediation, arbitration
and specialized resolution centers.' 4
In the end, the goal is not dispute resolution, alternative or other-
wise, but delivery of justice. Such a goal is worthy of, and indeed
demands, the most creative efforts we are capable of giving. Anything
less will produce only a mirage in the wasteland, rather than the promised
land of justice.
The rule becomes effective July 1, 1994, and will be monitored for effectiveness over a three
year period. See 507 N.W.2d at LVII-LXI (Advance Sheet No. 4, Dec. 28, 1993) (reprinting rule
802.12).
123. Differentiated case management refers to the practice of using case management
techniques and time schedules in different types of litigation. ABA JUD. ADMIN. DIVISION, 2
STANDARDS OF JUD. ADMIN. J 2.51 (1992).
124. Preliminary Report of the North Dakota Supreme Court Judiciary Planning Committee
(Nov. 8-9, 1993 meeting).
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